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QUESTIONABLE USES OF CANONS OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: WHY
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DECIDED "ANY" ONLY MEANS "SOME"
I. INTRODUCTION 1
In Small v. United States,2 the United States Supreme Court held that
the phrase "convicted in any court" in the United States Criminal Code's
unlawful gun possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),3 includes only
convictions handed down by domestic, and not foreign, courts.4 With this
decision, the Court resolved a circuit split over the question of whether a
defendant's convictions from jurisdictions other than U.S. federal and state
courts could apply under the statute.
The Supreme Court's decision was incorrect because in statutory
interpretation, a plain language reading, where possible, is preferable to a
strained reading that may or may not lead to fairer results for criminal
defendants. In the event of true ambiguity, legislative history and policy
concerns can be considered, but unless the statutory language itself is
obscure, courts should follow the language as written and permit Congress
to change the result if it is not the one that it intended. The language of the
statute in this case is clear as written. While the majority raises important
concerns about potential dangers in the enforcement of the statute as
written, they are likely overstated and do not warrant a departure from the
usual approach to statutory interpretation. The dissent raises more
significant concerns about future decisions based on questionable modes of
statutory interpretation that are introduced by the Court in this decision.
1 The title of this note is inspired, in part, by Tracey A. Basler, Note, Does "Any" Mean
"All" or Does "Any" Mean "Some"? An Analysis of the "Any Court" Ambiguity of the
Armed Career Criminal Act and Whether Foreign Convictions Count as Predicate
Convictions, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 147 (2002).
2 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005).
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000).
4 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1754.
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The Court's approach in this case is inconsistent with its approach in
other cases-including one decided on the same day -and will lead to
confusion among citizens in understanding their rights and responsibilities,
as well as for Congress in understanding how its statutes will be interpreted.
Looking beyond the decision itself, the Court's methods of reasoning could
have ripple effects in future cases.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE "FELON-IN-POSSESSION" STATUTE
The statute at issue in this case is 18 U.S.C. § 922, which enumerates
unlawful acts with regard to firearms under federal law. The statute, in
pertinent part, reads:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year .. to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.6
The Supreme Court in Small, and lower courts before it, had to
interpret the phrase "any court" to determine whether convictions that take
place in a foreign country serve as predicate convictions for purposes of this
statute. While the legislature could have clearly articulated this in the
statute itself, there is no reference to domestic or foreign courts in § 92 2(g),
where the plain language simply reads "any court." Section 921 provides
definitions for the chapter, and does not define "any court." The only part
that references language in § 922(g) is § 921 (a)(20), which exempts certain
federal and state crimes from the reach of § 922(g) by slightly altering the
definition of the predicate crime:
(20) The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"
does not include-
(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade
practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of
business practices, or
(B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and
punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.7
5 Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005), is discussed further, infra, in Part
VI.B. of the text.
6 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (emphasis added).
7 Id. § 921.
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There are two principal arguments that have been raised with regard to
this language. First, the proponents of including foreign convictions note
that the plain language excludes any specific mention of foreign
convictions, and conclude that they should still be included. 8 Second, and
in opposition to the first argument, some argue that the language excluding
particular federal and state crimes from the reach of the larger statute
indicates that Congress did not even consider foreign convictions when it
drafted the felon-in-possession statute, and therefore they should not be
included.9
Section 922(g) also has implications for repeat offenders. Under the
Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"),1 ° an individual convicted of a §
922(g) violation who has three or more previous convictions for violent
felonies or serious drug offenses in any court defined in § 922(g)(1) will be
fined and imprisoned for a minimum sentence of fifteen years."
B. PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT STATUTES
Two relevant firearms statutes were passed in 1968, the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act ("Safe Streets Act") in June, and the
Gun Control Act amending the Safe Streets Act in October. 12 While there
had been little Congressional interest in gun control legislation between
1938 and 1965,13 the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Senator Robert Kennedy in 1968 altered the political landscape.' 4 Title IV
of the Safe Streets Act specifically addressed Congress's concern about
firearms and firearm traffic. In the findings and declarations, Congress
declared that "the ease with which any person can acquire firearms other
than a rifle or shotgun (including criminals [and other parties of concern]) is
a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the
8 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1759 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 1756 ("Congress likely did not consider the matter.").
10 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
'Id.
12 For a short summary of the relevant history, see Aron J. Estaver, Note, Dangerous
Criminals or Dangerous Courts: Foreign Felonies as Predicate Offenses Under Section
922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 215, 235-38 (2005);
Christine A. Vogelei, Comment, The Fundamental (Un)Fairness of Foreign Convictions as
Predicate Felonies, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1317, 1320-24 (2005). For more detailed
coverage of both pieces of 1968 legislation, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
and the Gun Control Act, see William J. Vizzard, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 79 (1999).
13 Vizzard, supra note 12, at 80.
14 Id. at 83.
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United States.' 15 The Gun Control Act modestly revised Title IV of the
Safe Streets Act.'6
In 1986, Congress passed the Firearm Owners' Protection Act
("FOPA"), which represented the first major revision of the firearm laws
since the Safe Streets Act. 17 FOPA had great impact on the reach of state
and federal gun laws. FOPA streamlined the law with regards to which
classes of people would be prohibited from possessing or receiving
firearms. 18 While these classes had been defined under the 1968 and
subsequent law in two separate provisions in both Title IV and Title VII,
FOPA repealed Title VII and incorporated its definitional categories into
Title IV.19 However, the relevant language of § 922(g)(1) pertaining to the
current discussion remained essentially the same.2 °
C. PRIOR COURTS REVIEWING THE STATUTE HAVE DIFFERED ON
WHETHER "ANY COURT" INCLUDES OR EXCLUDES CONVICTIONS
IN FOREIGN COURTS
The Circuit Courts of Appeals have disagreed on whether a conviction
occurring in "any court" includes foreign court convictions. Circuits that
have permitted foreign convictions to stand as predicate offenses include
the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits. Circuits that have reviewed the same
statute and have excluded foreign convictions include the Second and Tenth
Circuits.
1. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits Focus on a Plain Language Reading of the
Statute and Include Foreign Convictions
The first court of appeals to consider the issue of the meaning of "any
court" with regard to foreign convictions was the Sixth Circuit in 1986 in
United States v. Winson.2t The defendant had been charged with unlawful
receipt of two firearms pursuant to § 922(h)(1), 22 based upon two prior
15 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, State Firearms Control
Assistance, Pub. L. No. 90-35 1, tit. IV, § 901(a)(2), 82 Stat. 197, 225 (1968).
16 Vizzard, supra note 12, at 86.
17 David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners' Protection Act: A Historical and Legal
Perspective, 17 CuMB. L. REv. 585, 585 (1987).
18 Id. at 639-42.
'9 Id. at 641.
20 The changes to § 922(g) were, in large part, related to drugs, drug abuse, and aliens.
Firearm Owners' Protection Act, Amendments to Section 922, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102,
100 Stat. 449, 451-52 (1986).
21 793 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1986).
22 At the time, § 922(h)(1) was substantially the same as the current § 922(g)(1), "making
it unlawful for any person 'who has been convicted in any court of... a crime punishable by
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convictions he had received in Argentina and Switzerland for possession of
counterfeit U.S. currency and fraud, respectively.23 The district court
reasoned that interpreting the statute to include foreign convictions would
"require judicial recognition of military tribunal adjudications in Nicaragua,
as well as condemnations of political prisoners in Poland," and Congress
would not have intended such an unfair result.24 Further, the court found
ambiguity when it considered § 922 juxtaposed with a similar code section
then in effect, § 1202, which by its terms only applied to domestic courts.25
The district court concluded that the principle of lenity should control and
dismissed the indictment.26
While the Sixth Circuit agreed that the principle of lenity should
govern when a criminal statute is ambiguous, it disagreed with the trial
court about the ambiguity of § 922.27 It found that the plain language of §
922 was clear, and that the statute only appeared ambiguous when viewed
in light of the limits of § 1202.28 However, following the Supreme Court's
reasoning in United States v. Batchelder,29 the Sixth Circuit identified clear
"congressional intent to give each statute an independent construction and
application, especially where, as here, the express language of the two
Titles indicates different meanings. 3 °  Further, with regard to fairness
considerations, the court found no evidence that the defendant's prior
convictions in Argentina and Switzerland were counter to American
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year... to receive any firearm or ammunition which
has been shipped... in interstate... commerce."' Id. at 756 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1)
(1982)) (emphasis added by court).
23 id. at 755-56.
24 Id. at 756 (quoting United States v. Winson, No. 3-84-00060, slip op. at 2-3 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 6, 1985)).
25 Id. Section 1202 stated that:
Any person who- (1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any
political subdivision thereof of a felony . . . and who receives, possesses, or transports in
commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
Id. at 756 n.3.
26 Id. The rule of lenity is a substantive canon of construction, as opposed to a linguistic
canon (focusing on the text of the statute) or a presumption about extrinsic sources (such as
those that consider appropriate the use of legislative history). William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Norms Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 674
(1999). The Supreme Court has stated on multiple occasions that "ambiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." Jones v. United States, 529
U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
27 Winson, 793 F.2d at 757.
28 Id.
29 442 U.S. 114 (1978).
30 Winson, 793 F.2d at 757.
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principles of constitutional law or in violation of the defendant's civil
rights. 3' The court also found it highly persuasive that mechanisms were in
place for an individual to seek relief from foreign convictions with regard to
the code sections at issue. 32  Accordingly, the court vacated the district
court's decision and remanded with directions to reinstate the indictment.33
Three years after Winson was decided, the Fourth Circuit decided
United States v. Atkins.34  The defendant in that case had received a
conviction by a court in England for unlawful possession of a firearm with
intent to endanger life, and had served three years of a five-year sentence.
35
After being found by military police with a handgun attached to his ankle,
he was arrested under § 922(g).36 He conditionally pleaded guilty,
reserving the question of whether his English conviction was a conviction
in "any court" under the statute.37 In a short opinion, the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the Sixth Circuit's approach in Winson.38  Based on their
analysis of legislative history and cases construing the statute, they
determined that Congress's intended meaning was unclear, but that there
was no uncertainty in the language itself.39 They concluded that "[i]f
statutory language is unambiguous, the principle of lenity is inapplicable. 40
The court then affirmed the judgment of the lower court against the
defendant. 41 The Atkins court closed by suggesting that any attack on this
statute should center on the word "court" rather than the word "any," given
that the plain meaning of "any" is expansive, and that different courts may
provide different experiences for defendants.42 However, the Fourth Circuit
31 Id.
32 Id. at 758. The court noted that "Section 925(c) authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury to grant such relief where an applicant shows that 'the circumstances regarding the
conviction, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be
likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would
not be contrary to the public interest."' Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (1982), which in its
current form remains substantially the same, except that the Attorney General and not the
Secretary of the Treasury has the power to grant the relief, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000),
amended by Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 11 12(f)(6), 116 Stat.
2135, 2276 (2002)).
33 Winson, 793 F.2d at 759.
14 872 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1989).
31 Id. at 95.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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declined to explore this issue because "Atkins suffered the misfortune of
violating foreign law in England, the country which provides the origin or
antecedent of the jurisdictional system employed in the United States of
America. 4 3 It is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit would have decided
differently had the predicate offense taken place in a country with a legal
system less similar to that of the United States.
2. The Second and Tenth Circuits Excluded Foreign Convictions, Focusing
on Potential Inequities Resulting from the Inclusion of Foreign Convictions
as Predicate Crimes
In recent years, additional court challenges have addressed the
language of the felon-in-possession statute. In 2000, the Tenth Circuit
decided United States v. Concha,44 in which the defendant was charged with
assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, use
of a firearm in connection with these charges, and being a felon in
possession of a firearm.45 The jury acquitted him of the assault and use of a
firearm charges, but convicted him of the lesser charge of simple assault. 6
He also was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 47 His
predicate crimes for the felon-in-possession statute included two burglary
48convictions, an arson conviction, and a sex offense conviction. Based on
his felony record, his sentence was enhanced under ACCA.4 9  The
defendant challenged the enhanced sentence on appeal, on the grounds that
three out of four prior felony convictions took place in the United
Kingdom.5 °
In determining whether the foreign convictions would serve as
predicate crimes under ACCA, the Tenth Circuit looked to the statutory
43 Id.
44 233 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000).
41 Id. at 1251.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. The sex offense conviction was for a lewd or lascivious act with a child under 14,
a felony crime which, under current law, carries a punishment of imprisonment for three, six,
or eight years. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West 2005).
49 ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000), imposes a harsher sentence on repeat criminals
with serious records. It institutes a minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment without
the possibility of probation for being a felon in possession of a firearm if the defendant has
three or more convictions for "violent felonies" or "serious drug convictions" that meet the
requirements of § 922(g)(1).
50 Concha, 233 F.3d at 1251. The burglary and arson convictions took place in the
United Kingdom, while the sex offense conviction took place in California. Id.
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definitions under 18 U.S.C. § 921."' Specifically, it focused on a limiting
provision under § 921(20):
The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" does not
include-
(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade
practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of
business practices, or
(B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and
punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.
52
The court expressed concern that by mentioning solely domestic
offenses within this limiting provision, fewer domestic crimes would be
covered by the statute than equivalent foreign crimes. 3 This court found it
to be an anomalous result; two similarly situated defendants who had
committed identical crimes in the United States or a foreign country would
be treated differently in the eyes of the law. 4
The Tenth Circuit additionally found persuasive authority in the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, which did not permit foreign
convictions to be considered for purposes of computing a defendant's
criminal history, but instead allowed such considerations only at a judge's
discretion in order to permit an enhanced sentence above the Guidelines
range for a particular defendant and crime.55  The court further found it
anomalous not to use prior foreign convictions to determine a sentence if
there were one or two convictions, but to require their use for sentencing
when there are three.56 The court took issue with including foreign
convictions in the absence of clear statutory directive because foreign
defendants do not always receive the constitutional protections that are
mandatory in the United States.57 Finally, the court reasoned that after the
Supreme Court had decided in Custis v. United States58 that § 924(e) does
51 Id. at 1253-54.
52 Id. (emphasis by court, not in original statute).
5' See id. at 1254.
54 Id. The court used the example that a person convicted of a an American antitrust
violation would be allowed to possess a firearm, while a person convicted of a British
antitrust violation would not, though it did note that neither of these would serve as an
enhancing prior crime under ACCA because an antitrust violation would be neither a violent




58 511 U.S. 485 (1994).
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not authorize collateral attacks on prior convictions, only very limited
challenges to foreign convictions were possible.59
The Tenth Circuit addressed the arguments of the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits in making its decision.60 On textual grounds, it weighed the
argument for including foreign convictions-based on the plain meaning of
"any" in "any court"-against the argument for not including them-the
definition in § 921(20) that limited only state and federal crimes-and
found that neither was compelling. 61 On policy grounds, it weighed the
reasons for including foreign crimes-foreign criminals as likely to be as
dangerous as domestic-against reasons for not including them-unfair
foreign convictions can be challenged only with difficulty, if at all-and
again found that neither was compelling.62  It turned to the legislative
history of the statute, but found that it did not help clarify the issue, and
therefore, the court concluded that the statute was ambiguous. 63 Based on
this, the Tenth Circuit relied on the rule of lenity and held that foreign
convictions cannot be used as predicate offenses for sentencing
enhancement.64
The Second Circuit encountered the same question in United States v.
Gayle.65 The defendant was found with multiple boxes of firearms in a
hotel room and was charged with two counts of firearms-related conspiracy
and one count for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §
59 Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254. According to the Tenth Circuit, Custis held that § 924(e)
does not authorize collateral attack on prior convictions, except for jurisdictional attacks
based on total deprivation of the right to counsel. Id. It did, however, leave open the
possibility of challenge by habeas petition. Id. The court was concerned, however, that even
if a habeas petition could be filed, that it might not be of much value, for two reasons. Id. at
1255. First, a habeas petition could not be filed until after the defendant began serving a
sentence. Id. If the defendant was otherwise innocent, he could end up serving time only
because of the inappropriate foreign convictions. Id. Second, in a habeas petition, the
burden of proof would lie on the defendant to show defects in previous convictions. Id.
Because the records kept in foreign court systems may be nonexistent or incomplete, it might
not even be possible to adequately challenge such a conviction. Id. The court viewed these
two factors as placing a substantial burden on a defendant in the absence of clear
congressional intent. Id.
60 Id. at 1255-56.
61 Id. at 1256.
62 id.
63 Id.
64 Id. (holding that the court "will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase
the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no
more than a guess as to what Congress intended" (quoting United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d
391, 393 (10th Cir. 1993))).
65 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003).
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922(g)(1). 66 The predicate offense for his felon-in-possession charge was a
Canadian conviction for using a firearm in the commission of an indictable
offense.67 The defense moved to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge on
the grounds that a Canadian conviction should not count as a predicate
crime, but the trial court followed the Fourth and Sixth Circuits' reasoning
in denying the motion to dismiss and held that the Canadian conviction was
a proper predicate offense under the statute. 68 The jury found the defendant
guilty on all three counts and sentenced him to over six years.69
The only issue for the court to decide on appeal was whether the
Canadian conviction satisfied the "any court" provision of § 922.70 By the
time the Second Circuit decided this case, the Third, Fourth, and Sixth
Circuits had decided that the "any court" language included foreign
convictions, while the Tenth Circuit had decided that it did not.71 The
Second Circuit began with the plain language of the statute.72 It noted that
some courts had included foreign courts within the definition of "any
court," while other courts had also included military courts within the term
"any court. 7 3  However, the court quickly moved beyond the language
itself to attempt to gain a contextual understanding by reviewing the
defimition provisions in § 921, as the Tenth Circuit had in Concha.
74
Identifying the same ambiguity in the language as the Tenth Circuit had, the
Second Circuit attempted to clarify the meaning of "any court" with an
analysis of the legislative history.75
The Second Circuit found evidence for a domestic-only reading of the
statute in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Gun Control Act,
which had defined a felony as a "Federal crime punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding 1 year and in the case of State law, an offense
determined by the laws of the State to be a felony., 76 When the Conference
Committee combined the House and Senate versions of the language, the
66 Id. at 90.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 90-91.
69 Id. at91.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 92. The decision of the Third Circuit in United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425 (3d
Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 385 (2005), is discussed in Part II1.B.2 of the text, infra.
72 Gayle, 342 F.3d at 92.
73 Id. (citing to decisions of the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in which convictions
by military courts were held to satisfy the "convicted in any court" requirements of the
felon-in-possession statute).
74 Gayle, 342 F.3d at 93; United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2000).
" Gayle, 342 F.3d at 93; Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254.
76 Gayle, 342 F.3d at 94 (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1501, at 31 (1968)).
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court found it persuasive that it adopted the House's language, "crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,, 77 and that it
had "voiced no disagreement with the Senate Report's explicit limitation of
felonies to include only convictions attained in domestic courts. 78
Accordingly, the court held that using foreign convictions as predicate
crimes was inconsistent with Congressional intent, and reversed the lower
court's decision. 79 The government filed a petition for rehearing the case en
banc, in part because it believed the panel had "anchored its decision to an
analysis of the wrong legislative history," 80 arguing that the "in any court"
language had roots in the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, and that the reports
relied on by the court were actually issued three to four months after
relevant legislation was passed into law.81 The Second Circuit denied the
petition, but amended its original decision, adding a footnote that dismissed
the government's claim because the reports relied upon were still "directly
part of the legislative history of the Gun Control Act of 1968.,,82
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Gary Small faced similar issues as Gayle and Concha under the felon-
in-possession statute. Small's predicate crime was a Japanese conviction,83
placing it squarely within the disagreement among the circuits discussed
above.8 4 Small's case went up to the Supreme Court, 5 allowing the Court
to definitively resolve the question of whether foreign court convictions
serve as predicate crimes under § 922.
A. FACTS
In 1992, Gary Small was arrested by Japanese authorities at Naha
Airport in Okinawa, Japan, when he tried to pick up a water heater he had
77 Id. at 95 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. 90-1956, at 4, 8, 28-29 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat.) 4426, 4428).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 95-96.
8o Petition for Rehearing En Banc or Alternatively Petition for Panel Rehearing at 2,
Gayle, 342 F.3d 89 (No. 02-1095), 2003 WL 24147468.
81 Id. at 6-7, 14.
82 Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95 n.7; see also Dionna K. Taylor, Comment, The Tempest in a
Teapot: Foreign Convictions as Predicate Offenses Under the Federal Felon in Possession
of a Firearm Statute [United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003)], 43 WASHBURN
L.J. 763, 763 n.1 (2004) (discussing the Gayle decision and subsequent amendment to the
opinion; characterizing footnote 7 as "hastily added").
83 Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1754 (2005).
84 See discussion of circuit split supra Part II.C.
8" Small, 125 S. Ct. 1752.
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mailed to himself from Pittsburgh. 6 Inside the water heater were "two
rifles, eight pistols, 420 rounds of ammunition, and five bags of
gunpowder."8 7  In April 1994, Gary Small was convicted in Japanese
District Court for violations of Japanese firearm and customs law. 8 Small
was sentenced to five years in Japanese prison.89  He was paroled in
November 1996, and his parole term ended in May 1998.90 In June 1998,
Small purchased a firearm from a dealer in the United States and
represented to the dealer that he had never been convicted of a crime
punishable by a sentence of more than one year.9' This formed the basis of
Small's August 2000 indictment before a federal grand jury in which he
was found to have made a false statement to a firearms dealer.92 His foreign
conviction also served as the basis for additional charges: two counts of
possession of a firearm by a felon and one count of possession of
ammunition by a felon.93
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. The District Court Considered the Plain Language of§ 922 and the
Fundamental Fairness of Small's Japanese Conviction in Determining that
the Foreign Conviction Qualified as a Predicate Crime
At the district court, Small moved to dismiss his indictment on the
grounds that the Japanese conviction should not have qualified as a prior
conviction under § 922. 94 In the alternative, he argued that even if foreign
convictions were covered under the statute, his Japanese conviction failed
to meet protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution.9" At the
time of the decision the Third Circuit had not yet considered the issue, so
the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania looked to other
circuits for guidance. The court reviewed the relevant decisions of the
Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, first considering whether foreign
86 Torsten Ove, Former Officer in New Round of Legal Woes, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Feb. 18, 2001, at C1.
87 id.
88 United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757 (W.D. Pa. 2002), affid, 333 F.3d 425
(3d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005).
89 Id. at 757 n.3.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 757.
92 Id. at 756-57. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (2000) prohibits making false statements to
licensed firearm dealers. Id. at 756 n.1.
9' Id. at 756-57.
94 Id. at 757.
95 Id.
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96
convictions should generally qualify as predicate crimes under the statute.
It agreed with the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, finding the "in any court"
language of § 922 to be unambiguous, thereby making the rule of lenity
inapplicable.97
Once the court found that foreign convictions could generally apply
for purposes of § 922, it turned to an analysis of which foreign convictions
should specifically apply.98 The court did not take the government's
expansive view that all such convictions should qualify, regardless of
fairness.99 The court noted that "procedural due process concerns are
automatically raised with the use of foreign criminal convictions"'' 00 and
that "[tihe criminal conduct underlying a foreign conviction may also be an
issue, given the differing views among foreign nations as to what
constitutes illegal conduct."'' l Based on these concerns, the district court
allowed Small to raise a constitutional challenge to his Japanese
conviction, 10 2 which the court believed to turn on the question of whether
the Japanese conviction comported with American concepts of fundamental
fairness. 0 3 The court began with a review of relevant provisions of the
Japanese Constitution, which it found guaranteed many of the same rights
as the U.S. Constitution. 104 After considering Small's specific challenges,
the district court held that the Japanese conviction was sufficiently
consistent with American notions of fundamental fairness and that the fact-
finding process leading to his conviction was sound. 0 5 As a result, the
court denied Small's motion to dismiss.'
0 6
96 Id. at 757-60. The Second Circuit had not decided on the issue at the time of this
decision.
9' id. at 759-60.
9' Id. at 760.
99 Id. at 761.
'o Id. at 762 n.7 (quoting Bean v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838 n.8 (E.D. Tex.
2000)).
10 Id. at 762 n.9.
102 Id. at 763.
103 Id. at 765.
104 Id. at 766.
105 Id. at 770. The court considered a number of claims by Small, including denial of
bail, lack of a speedy trial, judge substitution, testimony of a handwriting expert, lack of jury
trial, denial of right to remain silent, denial of right to confront accusers, and effectiveness of
counsel. Id. at 767-69.
106 Id. at 770.
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2. The Third Circuit Adopted the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law in
Evaluating Foreign Judgments for the Purposes of the Felon-in-Possession
Statute and Held that the District Court Correctly Recognized the Judgment
of the Japanese Court
Small appealed the district court's judgment against him by making
two arguments: first, that the district court failed to consider the totality of
circumstances in holding that the Japanese conviction was fundamentally
fair; and second, that an evidentiary hearing should have been held to make
that determination. 
107
In analyzing the first question, the Third Circuit agreed with the
district court that not all foreign convictions could be recognized, given the
possible lack of fundamental fairness under foreign systems of law. 08 In
order to ensure that foreign convictions used as predicate offenses comport
with American notions of fairness, the Third Circuit adopted the approach
of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provision for non-
recognition of foreign judgments. 0 9  The Restatement provides two
mandatory grounds and six discretionary grounds for which a court may not
recognize a foreign judgment." 0 The Third Circuit found that the district
court's analysis satisfied the elements of the Restatement test, and that the
use of Small's Japanese conviction as a predicate offense for the felon-in-
107 United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 427 (3d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 1752
(2005).
10s Id.
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987).
110 Section 482 of the Restatement states:
(1) A court in the United States may not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign state if:
(a) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law; or
(b) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction over the defendant in
accordance with the law of the rendering state and with the rules set forth in § 421.
(2) A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign state if:
(a) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
action;
(b) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to
defend;
(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(d) the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is repugnant
to the public policy of the United States or of the State where recognition is sought;
(e) the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled to recognition; or
(f) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties to
submit the controversy on which the judgment is based to another forum.
Id. (emphasis added).
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possession statute was appropriate."' On the second question of whether
the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing, the Third Circuit
again looked to the Restatement, which states that the recognizing court is
able to make the determination of fundamental fairness by judicial notice
and on the basis of general knowledge. 12 Hence, the court found no abuse
of discretion.' 13  Because the district court's analysis satisfied the
Restatement test, and there was no abuse of discretion in failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court decision.
1 14
Small appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 29,
2004."5
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
The Supreme Court entered into this confused fray of felon-in-
possession cases to resolve the circuit split. It held, in a 5-3 decision
written by Justice Breyer, that the phrase "convicted in any court"
encompassed only domestic, and not foreign, convictions.1 6 Justice Breyer
was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. 17 Justice
Thomas authored the dissenting opinion, and was joined by Justices Scalia
and Kennedy." 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision of this
case. 119
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Court began its analysis by considering whether the word "any"
alone in the statute was dispositive.120 It concluded that in both ordinary
life and in the law, "any" is normally constrained in its scope.'
2'
In attempting to understand Congress's intent regarding the statute, the
Court began by referencing the "commonsense notion that Congress
... Small, 333 F.3d at 428.
112 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b (1987)).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 429.
115 Small v. United States, 333 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 541 U.S. 958
(2004).
116 Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1753, 1758 (2005).
117 Id. at 1753.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1753-54.
120 Id. at 1754.
121 Id. The Court used the following example: "[A] speaker who says, 'I'll see any film'
may or may not mean to include films shown in another city." Id. The Court followed with




generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind., 122  This, the Court
reasoned, has led to the common presumption by Congress against
extraterritorial application of domestic statutes. 23  While the Court
admitted that the presumption did not apply directly in this case, it reasoned
that "a similar assumption is appropriate when we consider the scope of the
phrase 'convicted in any court' here."'' 24 The Court identified two reasons
why this assumption was appropriate: first, a conviction in any court is a
necessary element of the gun possession activity prohibited by domestic
law; and second, foreign convictions may differ in important ways from
domestic convictions. 125 Three potential problems with foreign convictions
were highlighted. First, foreign laws may criminalize activities that are
permitted or even encouraged under U.S. law. Second, foreign legal
systems may be inconsistent with American notions of fairness. Third,
similar crimes may be punished much more severely in foreign systems
than in the United States. 126 The Court found no convincing information
that Congress intended the statute to reach beyond domestic convictions,
and found that the statute's "subject matter [was not] special" as in
"immigration or terrorism, where one could argue that foreign convictions
would seem especially relevant.' ' 27  As a result, the Court assumed that
Congress intended that the phrase "convicted in any court" apply only
domestically.'
28
The Court then reviewed what the effects of including foreign
convictions under the statute might be, and found them to be anomalous.1
29
It analyzed the exception for federal or state antitrust crimes, the inclusion
of those with federal or state misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, and
the enhanced penalties for drug offenders. 130 The Court found that in each
area, similarly situated persons convicted of domestic as opposed to foreign
122 Id. at 1755 (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)).
123 Id. (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. For examples of each problem, the Court identified that: 1) private entrepreneurial
activity (buying and reselling for the purpose of making a profit) was criminalized under
Soviet law; 2) our notions of due process were violated by some countries' laws, for
instance, countries in which the testimony of one man equals that of two women; and 3)
vandalism in Singapore carried a harsh prison sentence of up to three years. Id. at 1755-56.
127 Id. at 1756.
128 Id.
129 id.
130 Id. at 1756-57.
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versions of the same crime would suffer different consequences under the
statute.
1 31
The Supreme Court then went on to consider the legislative history of
the statute. 32 Like the Gayle court, the Supreme Court identified that the
Senate bill had included a definition of the predicate crimes in terms of
federal and state crimes, which the Conference Committee ultimately
rejected in favor of the current "convicted in any court" language. 133 Also
like the Gayle court, the Supreme Court concluded that the change did not
reflect a change in congressional view.1 34 Rather, the Court wrote that
"those who use legislative history to help discern congressional intent will
see the history here as silent ... that simply confirms the obvious, namely
that Congress did not consider the issue."
'135
The Court admitted that the statute's purpose could support reading an
inclusion of foreign convictions based on the goal to keep firearms out of
the hands of people who are dangerous. 136 The Court, responding to the
dissent, also agreed that a person convicted of a serious crime abroad may
be just as dangerous as one who commits a serious crime in the United
States.1 37 However, the Court dismissed the argument as weakened by the
few instances since 1968 in which a foreign conviction has been used as a
predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution. 38 The majority reasoned
that this empirical fact "reinforces the likelihood that Congress, at best, paid
no attention to the matter."
1 39
The majority concluded that "convicted in any court" referred only to
domestic courts and not foreign ones.1 40 It could not find enough evidence
that Congress had intended specifically to include foreign convictions
within the reach of the statute. The Court reasoned that any added
enforcement advantages from the inclusion of foreign convictions were
outweighed by the potential for unfair outcomes, and neither the statutory





13 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 90-1501, at 31 (1968); H.R. CONF. REP. 90-1956, at 28-29
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat.) 4426, 4428).
134 Id.
135 Id.









The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, took issue with
the majority's conclusion that "any" means only "a subset of any" as well
as its departure from established principles of statutory construction. 42 The
dissent began by analyzing the word "any," just as the majority had, but
came to the conclusion that "[r]ead naturally, the word 'any' has an
expansive meaning" 143 and "[n]o exceptions appear on the face of the
statute." 144  The dissent concluded that "[t]he broad phrase 'any court'
unambiguously includes all judicial bodies with jurisdiction to impose the
requisite conviction-a conviction for a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term of more than a year. 1 4 5 The dissent considered the statute in
context, and was not moved by the presence of other provisions that limit
application or make exceptions for federal and state crimes.146 The dissent
noted that there was no jurisdictional qualification on the term "any
court."'
14 7 Further, there were "no special federalism concerns or other clear
statement rules that have justified construing 'any' narrowly in the past."'
148
Perhaps of greater concern to the dissent were the methods by which
the majority made its arguments. The dissent first questioned the Court's
"ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes. ' '149
The dissent saw that the logical result of this assumption was the creation of
a clear statement rule for Congress; the legislature would need to explicitly
describe when it intended for anything beyond the borders of the United
States to be included under a given statute. 50 While the canon against
extraterritorial application of federal statutes is familiar and well-supported,
the dissent argued that it should not apply in this case. 5' The dissent noted
that the criminal activity prohibited by the statute is gun possession within
the United States, not abroad.'52  The dissent argued that the two main
142 Id. at 1758 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 1759 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5
(1976)).
144 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980)).
141 Id. at 1759-60 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
146 Id. at 1760 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
148 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 1761 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent cited to a number of cases supporting the
canon against extraterritorial application of federal statutes, including some cases also cited
by the majority. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, the dissent concluded that in every
case, the Court had restricted "federal statutes from reaching conduct beyond U.S. borders,
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reasons for applying the doctrine of extraterritoriality related to first,
Congress legislating with domestic concerns in mind, and second, that
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws could conflict with foreign laws.
53
Neither of these issues was implicated by applying the felon-in-possession
statute in this case.154  Further, the dissent noted that the Court had
introduced this assumption without briefing or argument by the parties and
that it provided no guidance on what should constitute a "domestically
oriented statute."'155 The dissent noted that while the majority identified
immigration and terrorism as non-domestic concerns, in the past, "the
extraterritoriality canon 'has had special force' in statutes 'that may involve
foreign and military affairs."'' 1 56  The dissent cautioned that this
"threaten[ed] to wreak havoc with established rules for applying the canon
against extraterritoriality.' 57
The dissent then considered the majority's assertion that reading the
statute broadly has inappropriate results. 158 With regard to this, the dissent
disagreed with the notion that foreign convictions are necessarily less
reliable indicators of dangerousness than domestic convictions. 59  The
dissent characterized the examples of foreign crimes the majority used to
illustrate the problem as a "parade of horribles" and "cherry-pick[ed]. '' 6 °
The dissent also pointed out that the majority ignored the facts of this
specific case, in which a man was convicted under foreign law for serious
weapons charges, and then purchased a gun in this country) 6 '
The dissent then raised the issue of the canon against absurdities,
which should be employed only "where the result of applying the plain
language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd. . ... 16 The dissent argued
that the anomalies identified by the majority where some domestic
offenders were treated more harshly than similar foreign ones, as well as the
lend[ing] no support to the Court's unprecedented rule restricting a federal statute from
reaching conduct within U.S. borders." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 1761-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 1762 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,
188 (1993)).
157 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 1763 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent argued that the rarity of actual
prosecutions under § 922 for defendants with foreign convictions showed the majority's
"parade of horribles" to be overstated. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 1764 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Public Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491
U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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opposite being true, did not rise to the level of absurdity.' 63 The dissent
wrote: "As with the extraterritoriality canon, the Court applie[d] a mutant
version of a recognized canon when the recognized canon is itself
inapposite."' 64 The dissent then criticized the anomalies generated by the
Court's reading of the statute. 65  For instance, individuals convicted of
serious offenses abroad, like murder, rape, and kidnapping, could now
freely possess firearms in the United States, while a person convicted
domestically of tampering with a vehicle identification number 166 would be
prohibited from possessing firearms. The dissent wrote that "[t]he
majority's concern with anomalies provides no principled basis for
choosing its interpretation of the statute over [the dissent's].
'1 67
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's reliance on silence in the
legislative history, in particular the majority's interpretation that the
absence of discussion of foreign convictions persuasively showed a lack of
Congressional intent to include foreign convictions. 68 The dissent noted
that the change from the original Senate bill as amended in the Conference
Committee (removing the reference to state and federal crimes) is at least
suggestive that Congress intended to include more than domestic
convictions. 169 In the end, the dissent concluded that the majority never




Small v. United States was wrongly decided. It appears to have been
guided by a desire to reach a particular outcome rather than one of
following precedent and accepted modes of statutory analysis. The Court
ignored the specific facts of this case, and set the stage for unpredictability
in future decisions. Further, the Court gave no clear guidance about how
statutory language should be interpreted in the future, particularly regarding
the intersection of foreign and domestic law. On the same day that the
163 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
166 18 U.S.C. § 511(a)(1) (2000) provides a sentence of up to five years in prison for a
person who "knowingly removes, obliterates, tampers with, or alters an identification
number for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part .. "
167 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1764 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 1764-65 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 1765 (Thomas, J., dissenting). While the majority characterized the change as
simplification of the statutory language, the dissent noted that this characterization was
merely the majority's interpretation of the legislative history, Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Small decision was released, the Court, in Pasquantino v. United States,
upheld a broad reading of the word "any" in the wire fraud statute where the
defrauding scheme involved a foreign crime. 17' The Court's methods of
analysis set an unfortunate precedent with the potential for further
confusion.
A. THE COURT'S FAIRNESS CONCERNS ARE OVERSTATED
The majority in Small seemed most concerned with the potential that
innocent victims of foreign convictions would be swept up in the reach of
the felon-in-possession statute.' 72 The Court identified two major concerns:
first, that judges and prosecutors would not be able to adequately determine
whether foreign convictions merit inclusion; and second, that those who had
been convicted in foreign courts would be uncertain about their legal
status. 173 While the Court raised these concerns, it did not persuasively
explain the rationale behind them. Further, these concerns are seemingly
inconsistent with the Court's own understanding of Congressional intent
from previous case law.
Regarding the first concern regarding the ability of courts and
prosecutors to make a fairness determination, it is clear that lower courts
have already grappled with this, and will likely continue to do so, regardless
of the Supreme Court's decision in Small.174 In fact, in the lower court
decisions that led up to Small, both the trial court and circuit court
discussed and chose reasonable methods for assessing the quality of the
foreign convictions and making certain that they comport with American
notions of fundamental fairness prior to using them as predicate crimes
under the statute in question.
75
If the trial court reviews both the characteristics of the foreign crime
itself to determine whether it satisfies American notions of legality, as well
171 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005).
172 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1755-56.
"' Id. at 1756.
174 Both federal and state courts have had to consider how to treat foreign convictions
under a number of state and federal laws. See generally Alex Glashausser, Note, The
Treatment of Foreign Country Convictions as Predicates for Sentence Enhancement under
Recidivist Statutes, 44 DuKE L.J. 134 (1995).
175 See supra Parts III.B.1-2. In dicta, the district court in Small noted that a prior
conviction by a Taliban court for illegal possession of a bible would have been inappropriate
to recognize as a felony conviction. United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 762-63 n.9
(W.D. Pa 2002), ajd, 333 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005).
However, in the case at bar, Small's conduct of firearms and ammunition smuggling were
felonious under U.S. law, and as such, the court concluded that the crime was appropriate to
recognize for purposes of the U.S. felon-in-possession statute. Id.
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as the process by which the conviction was reached, it seems that the
Court's fairness concerns will be satisfied. The Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law chosen by the Third Circuit offers one clear
approach. 176 One commentator has suggested requiring that two conditions
be satisfied before a foreign crime be considered a predicate under § 922(g):
first, that the foreign conviction would also have been a predicate crime had
it taken place in the United States; and second, that the foreign court system
be found fair.' 77 In proposing new legislation in the Senate that addresses
the decision of the Court in Small, the sponsors have approved the first
prong of this suggested test. However, the proposed language does not
consider any review of the fairness of the foreign court.' 78 Should such a
bill be passed and signed into law, it remains to be seen whether its
exclusion of a fairness review of the foreign court proceeding would satisfy
the Constitution.
The second concern raised by the Supreme Court regarding the
uncertain legal obligations of those with foreign convictions is largely
illusory. By enacting any rule at all, the Court would have clarified the
legal obligations of those citizens with foreign convictions. In Small, by
deciding that only domestic convictions satisfied the statute, the Court made
it clear that citizens' foreign convictions will carry no weight under the
felon-in-possession statute, and therefore those with foreign convictions
have no legal obligations with respect to those convictions. However, if the
court had alternatively ruled that foreign convictions do constitute predicate
176 United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 1752
(2005); see also supra Part III.B.2 (describing the Third Circuit's use of the Restatement
test, with its two mandatory and six discretionary grounds under which a U.S. court may or
may not recognize a foreign conviction).
177 Christine Aubin, Note, United States v. Gayle, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 847, 854
(2004).
178 In the Senate, Senators Mike DeWine, a Republican, and Dianne Feinstein, a
Democrat, have cosponsored the Firearms Fairness and Security Act. S. 954, 109th Cong. §
2 (2005). The bill explicitly addresses the intent to include both foreign and domestic
convictions. Id. It includes only foreign convictions for conduct which would give rise to a
term of imprisonment in the United States had the conduct taken place here. Id As
modified by the bill, § 922(g)(1) would read:
(1) who has been convicted-
(A) in any court within the United States, of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding 1 year; or
(B) in any court outside the United States, of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding 1 year (except for any crime involving the violation of an antitrust law), if the
conduct giving rise to the conviction would be punishable in any court within the United
States by a term of imprisonment exceeding t year had such conduct occurred within the
United States;
[Vol. 96
SMALL v. UNITED STATES
crimes, individuals with those crimes would have been placed on notice
about their potential liability under the statute. Hence, the end result would
have been increased clarity regarding their legal obligations., 79 Regarding
the Court's concern about casting too wide a net by including foreign
convictions, the Court could have required that individuals with foreign
convictions be permitted to take advantage of the provisions already
existing under the current statute to seek relief from the prohibitions against
firearm possession. 80
There is one wrinkle regarding the relief provision-applying for relief
under the statute is essentially unavailable at this time because the agency
responsible for reviewing such applications, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF"), has lacked funding for this
purpose since 1992.181 While there also remains a statutory option for relief
through an official pardon or expungement of a conviction, 182 this would be
extremely difficult for those with either domestic or foreign convictions to
pursue. Pardons are given at the complete discretion of the governor (at the
state level) or the president (at the federal level), and a decision to pardon
may be strongly affected by the perception of such an action by the voting
179 It is true that the presumption that a foreign conviction will count as a predicate crime
under the felon-in-possession statute does not set as clear a rule as the one the majority
picked in Small. However, the administrative convenience of completely eliminating
liability for those with foreign convictions must be weighed against the costs to public safety
that the majority's rules will bring (namely, exempting potentially dangerous individuals
from the prohibition on gun possession).
180 Citizens who wish to have their rights to possess firearms restored after a felony
conviction may do so by following the review process outlined in § 925(c):
A person ... may make application to the Attorney General [or his designated representative] for
relief from disabilities imposed by Federal laws . . . and [he] may grant such relief if it is
established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant's
record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous
to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000), amended by Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
296, § 1112(f)(6), 116 Stat. 2135, 2276 (2002).
'8' Congress made an active decision to withdraw all funding for § 925(c) reviews by the
ATF. See Mark M. Stavsky, No Guns or Butter for Thomas Bean: Firearms Disabilities and
Their Occupational Consequences, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1759, 1759-60 (2003). It is
important to note that an application submitted but not reviewed under the current system
cannot be appealed into federal court, as per the Court's 2002 decision in United States v.
Bean, holding that district courts do not have jurisdiction to review § 925(c) applications
unless the ATF has made a final decision (namely, denial) with regards to their § 925(c)
application. 537 U.S. 71, 74, 77-78 (2002).
182 The statute also provides that any conviction "which has been expunged, or set aside,
or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored" is not considered a
predicate conviction for purposes of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(20) (quoted in Black v.
Snow, 272 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24 n.4 (D.D.C. 2003)).
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public. 183  In essence, then, by eliminating foreign convictions from the
reach of the statute, the Court has taken individuals who would have been
burdened by this statute (albeit possibly unfairly) and given them an
automatic "out." This raises the question of why those with foreign
convictions should be in a better position as compared to their counterparts
with domestic convictions, who are without practical means of seeking
relief. The answer to this question is unclear, unless the Court simply
believed that many individuals would be unfairly swept up by foreign
convictions that would violate American notions of fairness. This appears
to be an overstatement, however, given the evidence that few cases of
felons with foreign convictions have been prosecuted by the government
under this statute. 
84
Congress's lack of funding for § 925(c) application reviews indicates
that it prefers to keep potentially dangerous people from having access to
firearms, even if they may no longer be a threat to public safety and deserve
to have their rights restored.18 5 This reflects a response to pressure from
citizens to prevent felons from having their rights restored. 186 Because this
policy has continued to remain in effect, even after efforts were made to
fund § 925(c) reviews in alternate ways, it seems clear that Congress has
made the policy decision that it is preferable to keep the § 925(c) review
process unavailable to convicted felons.' 87  In a political environment
employing such a sweeping net for felons, it is odd that the Court thought it
appropriate to completely exclude all individuals with foreign convictions
from the reach of the statute. This is even more puzzling because, in 2002,
when the Court reviewed this issue in United States v. Bean, it issued a
unanimous opinion confirming that the federal courts had no jurisdiction
183 See Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U.
CH. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 102 (1999).
184 In oral arguments, the government attorney stated that there had been "no more than
'10 to a dozen' instances in which such a foreign conviction has served as a predicate for a
felon-in-possession prosecution." Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1758 (2005)
(quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Small, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (No. 03-750)).
185 The policy of restricting access to firearms by those deemed dangerous is consistent
with the findings of Congress as incorporated into Title IV of the Safe Streets Act of 1968.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
186 See Michael Isikoff, BATF Allows Some Felons to Own Guns: Violence Policy Center
Calls U.S. Program "Unconscionable, "WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1991, at A21.
187 The House Appropriations subcommittee overseeing the ATF budget voted to fund
the review process by imposing a fee on felons requesting review of their status. See John
Mintz, Move to Allow Felons to Own Firearms Draws Criticism, WASH. POST, July 1, 1995,
at A8. There was a significant negative reaction to this move, however, and the language
limiting the ATF from § 925(c) review has remained unchanged since it was introduced in
1992. See Stavsky, supra note 181, at 1773-74.
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unless and until the ATF has issued a formal denial of a § 925(c)
application, a move which seems to defer to the demonstrated preferences
of the legislature. 88 Essentially, the Court is placing similarly situated
individuals in different positions-those with domestic predicate felonies
have almost no recourse under the statute, while those with foreign
predicate felonies have no penalty and are outside the reach of the statute.
This is hardly a fair result, and not one that Congress likely intended.
B. A LACK OF CLARITY AND CONSISTENCY RESULTS FROM A DIVIDED
COURT
On the same day that the Small decision was released, Pasquantino v.
United States 89 was also decided. In Pasquantino, the Court held that the
U.S. wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, covered a scheme taking place in
the United States where the defendants smuggled large amounts of alcohol
into Canada, resulting in a significant loss of tax revenue to Canada.' 90 A
central facet to the decision was interpreting that "any scheme" included
one that involved a foreign crime. 19' Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, disagreed
with what she characterized as domestic enforcement of foreign tax laws in
violation of "our repeated recognition that 'Congress legislates against the
backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.,,1' 92 She reasoned
that such a broad reading would give the statute extraterritorial effect
without clear Congressional intent that extraterritorial effect was actually
desired. 19 3  The Court, in contrast, characterized the case as about "a
criminal prosecution brought by the United States in its sovereign capacity
to punish domestic criminal conduct"' 94 -namely, the use of interstate
wires to effect "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises."' 95 So while the majority in Pasquantino permitted a foreign
crime to trigger domestic criminal law, the majority in Small disallowed
foreign convictions from being predicate crimes under the felon-in-
possession gun statute. This apparent contradiction was picked up by the
188 United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 72, 77-78 (2002).
189 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005).
190 Id. at 1770.
191 Id. at 1780-81.
192 Id. at 1782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
193 Id. at 1784-85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 1775.
195 Id. at 1770 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000)).
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press and reflected in reports on the decisions in these two cases. 196 While
the cases resulted in different outcomes, it is not clear whether there is a
principle that underlies the different approaches between the two cases,
other than the fact that different Justices wrote the majority opinions.
97
While one can easily see that Justices Breyer and Ginsburg disagreed with
Justice Thomas, the curiosity comes in the positions of Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, who voted with the majority in both decisions and Justice Scalia,
who dissented in both decisions. It would appear that something other than
a purely conservative-liberal split was at play here.
1 98
In attempting to determine if there is a reasoned rationale for joining
the majority in each case, it is important to consider the distinctions
between the cases. In Small, the important consideration may have been
removing potentially unfair "scarlet letters" from citizens' records that
could limit their rights to possess firearms. For instance, the defendant in
United States v. Bean was no longer able to pursue his career as a gun
196 The media reported on and commented on the inherent tension between these two
cases. See, e.g., Charles Lane, 2 Rulings Reveal Views on Effects of Overseas Law, WASH.
POST, Apr. 27, 2005, at A2 ("The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that the government may
not deny a U.S. citizen gun ownership because of a criminal conviction abroad-but may
prosecute one for plotting to cheat a foreign government out of tax revenue."); Marshall H.
Tanick, Meaning of 'Any'Dogs Difficult Decisions, MINN. LAW., October 3, 2005, at 16 ("In
Small v. United States, the Supreme Court, by a 5-3 vote, held that the word "any" in the
federal statute prohibiting possession of guns by convicted felons applies only to convictions
in this country and not abroad.... But Thomas, writing for a 5-4 majority, won his point on
the meaning of "any" in Pasquantino v. United States. Construing the Federal Wire Fraud
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, he gave the phrase the extra-territorial effect he longed for in his
dissent in Small.") (citations omitted); Mark R. Winston, 'Pasquantino v. United States'-
New Ammunition Against Fraud, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 2005, at 7 ("It is worth noting that,
ironically, on the very day that it issued the Pasquantino decision, the Supreme Court issued
another decision in a criminal case with an international component. However, in that case,
Small v. United States, it was precisely because of the international aspect of the case that the
Court reversed the defendant's conviction.") (citation omitted).
197 In Pasquantino, Justice Thomas wrote for the majority and was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at
1769. As noted, supra Part IV, in Small, Justice Breyer wrote for the majority and was
joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. Small v. United States, 125 S.
Ct. 1752, 1753 (2005).
198 One newspaper columnist characterized the differing decisions in the cases as a split
between conservative and liberal ideology on whether to read statutory language literally or
contextually. David G. Savage, A Day of Semantics for High Court: Two Decisions, on Gun
Ownership and Liquor Smuggling, Exemplify the Tension Between Literal and Contextual
Readings of the Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A10.
[Vol. 96
SMALL v. UNITED STATES
dealer after serving time for a questionable conviction in Mexican court. 199
While the Court ruled unanimously in that case against the defendant,2 °0
perhaps on reflection, the Justices in the majority in Small decided that the
potential harms from lack of any meaningful review process were real and
outweighed potential safety concerns. In contrast, in Pasquantino, it is
possible that the majority identified fraud of all kinds, even that which
ultimately places its burdens on foreign governments, as worthy of
punishment under domestic law. This could be read into Justice Thomas's
comments at the end of the majority opinion in Pasquantino, when in
response to concerns made by the dissent, he wrote: "[T]he wire fraud
statute punishes the scheme, not its success," and it is the "domestic
element of petitioners' conduct" that "the Government is punishing in this
prosecution. ,21 It is unfortunate, however, that there is no clear
articulation of how these cases should set precedents for future
interpretation regarding when and how foreign criminal acts and
convictions can trigger liability under domestic law. Perhaps the clearest
outcome is that stated by Justice Thomas in dissent in Small-if Congress
wants a predictable outcome when foreign laws might be implicated under a
domestic statute, it must now clearly state what that correct interpretation
should be.202
C. THE COURT'S USE OF METHODS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IS
QUESTIONABLE
"Courts [] do their best work in construing statutes when they fulfill
their role as guardians of the law's continuity and coherence., 20 3 While the
199 Bean was a gun dealer who drove into Mexico and maintained that the box of
ammunition left in plain view inside his vehicle was accidentally left there. He was
convicted in Mexican court for importing ammunition into Mexico and sentenced to five
years in prison. United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 72-73 (2002).
200 Id. at 72.
201 Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1780 (quoting, in part, United States v. Pierce, 224
F.3d 158, 166 (2nd Cir. 2000)).
202 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1761 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("After today's ruling, the only way
for Congress to ensure that courts will construe a law to refer to foreign facts or entities is to
describe those facts or entities specifically as foreign."). As a matter of statutory
interpretation, if there was evidence that Congress had considered the issue of foreign
convictions, and if Congress had drafted the statute clearly with regards to the applicability
of foreign convictions, it seems extremely unlikely that any court would have gone beyond
the language of the statute itself to decide a specific case. A question that remains open,
however, is whether a statute that did explicitly include foreign convictions would pass
Constitutional muster, given the concerns noted by various courts and commentators
regarding the validity of foreign convictions, see discussion supra in Part V.A.
203 Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence and the Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1389,
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extent to which canons of construction improve predictability and constrain
the judiciary are open to debate,204 this is clearly part of their goal. When
the Court uses a canon in novel ways, systemic predictability is decreased,
which has negative effects on both the citizens and the legislature.
1. The Court Misleads in Its Use of the "Commonsense Notion That
Congress Generally Legislates with Domestic Concerns in Mind "205 to
Justify Its Approach
Both the majority and dissent cited to a series of cases regarding the
presumption (or canon) against extraterritorial application, 20 6 but these
cases were used to different ends. The majority introduced them to
analogize from them an ordinary assumption that Congress legislates with
domestic concern. 207 The dissent reiterated the holdings to demonstrate that
the presumption against extraterritorial application in its traditional form
did not apply to conduct taking place within U.S. borders.208  The
presumption against extraterritorial application has a long history, though
the weight that it has carried in judicial interpretation has varied over
time. 209 It appears to have had a resurgence since 1991, with application by
the Supreme Court to Title VII, the Foreign Services Immunity Act, the
1461 (2005).
204 See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., supra note 26, at 671-73 (discussing the difficulties that would
be involved in creating empirical studies to determine the effectiveness of canons of
statutory construction); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons about how Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06
(1950) (showing a series of canons ("thrust") and counter-canons ("parry"), along with
examples of their use in various cases).
205 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1755 (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5
(1993)).
206 For an overview of the presumption against extraterritorial application, see William S.
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERK. J. INT'L L. 85
(1998).
207 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1755. One of the cases the Small majority cited was Foley Bros.
v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949). In that case, the Court applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality to labor law, reasoning that "unless a contrary intent appears, [legislation]
is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States" based upon "the
assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions." Foley Bros.,
336 U.S. at 285.
208 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1761-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent focused on the
holdings of the cases cited to by the majority, and in each case, the holding involved
"restricting federal statutes from reaching conduct beyond U.S. borders, lend[ing] no support
to the Court's unprecedented rule restricting a federal statute from reaching conduct within
U.S. borders." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
209 See Dodge, supra note 206, at 85-87.
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Federal Tort Claims Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act.21 ° It has
even been used as part of the analysis in the "war on terror," as to whether
federal district court has habeas jurisdiction over prisoners in Guantanamo
Bay.211
To understand the disagreement between the majority and the dissent
regarding the application of the presumption against extraterritoriality in
this case, it is important to consider the rationale behind the canon, as well
as the types of applications it has had historically. One author has
212identified five bases on which to find the extraterritoriality presumption.
The one relevant to this discussion is based on an attempt to predict the
legislature's intent in the absence of explicit information-the idea that
Congress normally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.21 3 As there
are cases where the Supreme Court has used this rationale to justify its
application of the extraterritoriality presumption, this contradicts the
dissent's remark that the Court "invent[ed] a canon of statutory
interpretation" in Small.
214
The dissent correctly noted, however, that the way the Court applies
the principle against extraterritorial application in Small is at odds with the
general historical precedent. The principle has generally been used when
the effects of conduct are felt within the United States.21 5 As articulated by
the Court, "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. 21 6 Further, to apply this rule, the Court will consider whether the
statutory language "gives any indication of a congressional purpose to
210 Id. at 87.
211 See John K. Setear, A Forest with No Trees: The Supreme Court and International
Law in the 2003 Term, 91 VA. L. REV. 579, 623 (2005) (discussing Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct.
2686 (2003), which held that the extraterritoriality presumption did not apply to questions of
habeas jurisdiction at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base because under the express terms of the
agreement between the United States and Cuba, the United States had both jurisdiction and
control over the naval base).
212 Curtis A. Bradley, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Intellectual Property Law:
Principal Paper: Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 505, 5 13-16 (1997) ("A review of the Supreme Court's extraterritoriality decisions.
. . reveals that the Court has articulated at least five justifications for the presumption:
international law, international comity, choice-of-law principles, likely congressional intent,
and separation-of-powers considerations.").
213 Id. at 516, 516 nn.47-48 (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993);
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949)).
214 Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1761 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
215 Dodge, supra note 206, at 119.
216 EEOC, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros. 336 U.S. at 285).
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extend its coverage beyond places over which the United States has
sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control. 217 Here, the statute
applies specifically to domestic conduct-preventing possession of a
firearm by persons convicted of serious crimes.
If the Court has interpreted Congress to be primarily concerned about
conduct with effects within the borders of the United States, use of the
presumption against extraterritoriality actually weighs in the dissent's favor.
Crimes committed abroad will still have value in terms of this presumption
of domestic concern because Congress sought to "keep guns out of the
hands of those who have demonstrated that they may not be trusted to
possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society. 218  Where the
demonstrative conduct occurred is irrelevant if keeping guns out of the
hands of dangerous people within the United States was the concern of
Congress. In effect, by raising this presumption, and using it to these ends,
the Court has subverted the principle's meaning.
2. The Court's Use of the Absurdity Doctrine Is Also Problematic
In general, the Supreme Court begins its analysis of "all statutory
construction cases ...with the language of the statute., 219 "When the
statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where
the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according
to its terms., 220  As frequent disputes about statutory language show,
however, courts often delve into the legislative history in order to decide
their cases.221 This is an approach that has had greater support at different
times in history, and in different contexts, and continues to engender a
lively discourse.222
217 Id.
218 Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1758 (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103,
112 (1983)).
219 Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
220 Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 124 S. Ct. 1023, 1030 (2004) (quoting Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)).
221 Stephen Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester W Roth Lecture: On the Uses of Legislative
History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 848-61 (1992) (identifying five
broad categories of decision-making in which use of legislative history has been beneficial:
avoiding absurd results, correcting drafting errors, clarifying words with special meanings in
context, identifying a "reasonable purpose," and "choosing among reasonable interpretations
of a politically controversial statute").
222 See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 205, 206, 206 nn.1-2 (2000).
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It seems that even those Justices who generally disfavor the use of
legislative history will still support denying the plain meaning of a statute if
the outcome of following the text is absurd.223 This is confirmed by the
Statutes and Statutory Construction treatise, which notes that "if the literal
import of the text of an act is inconsistent with the legislative meaning or
intent, or such interpretation leads to absurd results, the words of the statute
will be modified to agree with the intention of the legislature., 224 The
desire to reach the intent of the legislature must be carefully tempered,
however, by the risk that such judicial interpretation may be viewed by the
legislature or the citizenry as overreaching on the part of the judiciary.225
This is reflected by a Court that will contradict legislative text only when
such application would "produce results that [are] not merely odd, but
positively absurd.,
226
In Small, Justice Thomas's dissent criticized the majority's approach
on use of the absurdity doctrine. 7  The dissent acknowledged the
majority's concerns about potential anomalies that might result from
permitting foreign convictions to count as predicate crimes under the felon-
in-possession statute. 8 However, the dissent argued that these anomalous
results did not rise to the level of absurdity, and that they may even be
sensible. 229  Further, the dissent showed that following the majority's
reasoning produces anomalous results as well, and it argued that there was
no principled reason for choosing one interpretation over the other.230 The
majority would likely counter that it used the anomalous results as one of
multiple factors in making its decision to disallow foreign convictions.
This would lead to inclusion of fewer individuals under the statute-
essentially applying the rule of lenity.
223 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2419-20
nn. 122-24 (2003).
224 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:7 (6th ed. 2000)
(footnotes omitted).
225 Id.
226 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) (emphasis added).
227 Justice Thomas referred to the absurdity doctrine as "the canon against absurdities."
Id. at 1764 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
228 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
229 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
230 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The question that is raised by the disagreement between the majority
and dissent on this point is where the line between anomaly and absurdity
should lie. Historically, it seems as though the results of a statute would
have to be fairly extreme and obvious for it to be declared absurd.231 The
problem with broadening this definition, and applying it in cases of mere
anomaly, is that it reduces predictability in the legal system. This loss of
predictability, in turn, may result in direct costs to those who have relied on
the previous interpretation of the statutory language. It is also possible that
public confidence in judicial decision-making could be eroded if judges
were given additional latitude by which to overrule statutes. Because of its
potential dangers, this is a tool that the Court should use only in very
limited circumstances.232
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a legal maxim that "hard cases make bad law";233 however,
any case can make bad law if the wrong tools are used in making that
decision. In this case, the Court employed questionable canons of
construction, placed unnecessary new burdens on Congress in drafting
legislation and, in a very real sense, contravened the plain language and
purpose of a statute to reach a "fair" result. If the Court had used a plain
language reading of the statute and this was not what Congress intended,
Congress could have amended the statute. Of course, Congress can still
amend the statute following the Court's decision here as well. However,
Justice Kennedy wisely noted that "[i]t is beyond our province to rescue
Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might
think... is the preferred result., 234 By "rescuing" Congress here, the Court
has placed a burden on the legislature to draft both more expansively and
more precisely in the future.
Other than showing the public that different panels of the Court see
things differently, this divergence failed to clarify what should happen
generally when international law intersects with domestic law. Perhaps the
ultimate takeaway is simply that Congress must explicitly define the
boundaries of legislation when it comes to matters of both domestic and
international concern. Because this case interpreted a statute and not the
Constitution, the effects can be mitigated by Congressional action, and
231 See Manning, supra note 223, at 2399-2402.
232 For more background on the doctrine of absurdity and ways that the courts have used
it, see generally Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining
the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127 (1995).
233 See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 106 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
234 United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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there are indications that this may indeed occur.235 The ultimate outcome
remains to be seen, both by Congress's and the Court's future actions.
Anthony L. Engel*
235 In addition to the Senate bill discussed supra in note 178, members of the House have
introduced their own bill in response to the Small decision. The Foreign Felon Gun
Prohibition Act is sponsored by Representative Carolyn McCarthy of New York and is
cosponsored by three other representatives. H.R. 1931, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). The bill
addresses the intent of these representatives to include foreign convictions as predicate
crimes under the felon-in-possession statute, by adding "including any foreign court"
explicitly to the "any court" language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) and § 922(g)(1). Id.
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